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Abstract
Differential fertility preferences for men and women may provide insights into human sexual conflict. We
explore whether pairbonded couples have different preferences for future offspring, which socioecological
factors are associated with these preferences, and who achieves their desired fertility over time. We utilise
the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal survey which collected data from 1993 to 2015, to
compare desired future fertility for 9655 couples and follow couples who had divergent preferences. The
majority of couples (64.8%) want the same number of future offspring. In 20.7% of couples, husbands
want more future offspring than their wives, while the reverse occurs in 14.5% of couples. Living in vil-
lages with the husband’s or the wife’s parent(s) is associated with having divergent preferences for future
offspring, where there is a higher likelihood that women prefer more offspring than their husbands. When
examining fertility outcomes, women, particularly those who marry at older ages, are more likely to
achieve their desired preference. Contrary to previous research, we do not find that living near one’s
natal kin or having increased autonomy increases an individual’s likelihood of achieving desired fertility
outcomes.
Keywords: desired fertility; ideal family size; sexual conflict; Indonesia
Social media summary: Who wants more children and who achieves their preference? A longitudinal
study of Indonesian couples finds out.
Studies that examine fertility intentions find that when differences occur between men and women, it
is typically women who want fewer children than men, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bankole &
Singh, 1998; Borgerhoff Mulder, 2009; Nii-Amoo Dodoo, 1993; Ratcliffe, Hill, & Walraven, 2000). In
contrast, when examining couples, the majority agree on whether to have additional children – par-
ticularly when examining contexts outside of Sub-Saharan Africa (Mason & Smith, 2000; Mason &
Taj, 1987; Moya, Snopkowski, & Sear, 2016). It is simultaneously possible that men want more chil-
dren than women across multiple partners, but that within a particular pairbond, men and women
have similar preferences. Differences in desired fertility may represent sexual conflict, where one part-
ner wants to continue having offspring and the other would prefer to delay or cease reproduction.
Sexual conflict is defined as ‘a conflict between the evolutionary interests of individuals of the two
sexes’ (Arnqvist & Rowe, 2005; Parker, 1979) or more precisely ‘sexually antagonistic selection on
shared traits’ (Rowe & Day, 2006). This occurs when selection favours sex-specific reproductive strat-
egies that increase the reproductive success of one sex while simultaneously reducing (or constraining)
fitness of the other sex (Aloise King, Banks, & Brooks, 2013; Stumpf, Martinez-Mota, Milich, Righini, &
Shattuck, 2011). Sexual conflict is frequently displayed and documented in promiscuous species where
males exploit female optima in an attempt to increase their own fitness (Barkow & Burley, 1980) through
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mechanisms such as limiting female mate choice (Chapman, 2018; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995;
Smuts & Smuts, 1993) or increasing investment/production of offspring for a given reproductive
event above the female’s optimal level (Chapman, 2001; Haig, 2010). Females exhibit their own adap-
tations to counter male strategies to co-opt their fitness optima (Chapman, 2018; Mulder & Rauch,
2009). Sexual conflict is reduced when the relative proportion of a female’s progeny is fathered by a
single male (Barkow & Burley, 1980). Sexual conflict is eliminated when individuals reproduce with
one, and only one, mate for their entire lives (Holland & Rice, 1999). In this case, each individual’s
fitness is directly tied to their partner – so maximising reproductive success of one individual simul-
taneously maximises it for their partner. Humans engage in long-term pairbonding but do not mate
exclusively with one partner for life. This suggests that sexual conflict should be lower in humans than
in other species where pairbonding is rare, but that it is not absent.
Sexual conflict over fertility preferences
Differential fertility preferences, defined as the desired or ideal number of offspring for men and
women, may represent sexual conflict if this represents different optimal fertility rates across the
sexes. Differences in fertility preferences do not, by themselves, indicate sexual conflict as maximisation
of non-fitness currencies may also explain these differences, see below. Sexual conflict is frequently
explained as the result of asymmetries in the minimum investment required for reproduction for
males and females (Aloise King et al., 2013), although a variety of factors need to be considered
(Kokko & Jennions, 2008). Human females bear higher reproductive costs for each reproductive
event than human males. Pregnant and lactating women require between 200 and 630 additional kilo-
calories per day (Butte & King, 2005; Jasienska, 2020). Males, in contrast, have substantially lower min-
imal energetic demands for reproduction, only that to produce sperm (but note that substantial energy
may be needed to acquire a mate; Moya et al., 2016). Investment in human offspring, though, requires
extensive investment beyond that needed to birth and wean an offspring. While mothers in the majority
of non-human primate species are the exclusive caretaker for infant offspring, humans are unique in
that many individuals, in addition to the mother, provide care for offspring (Helfrecht, Roulette,
Lane, Sintayehu, & Meehan, 2020; Hrdy, 2005, 2009; Mace & Sear, 2005; Sear & Mace, 2008).
Human males may have minimal obligate investment in offspring, but their actual investment is typ-
ically much larger. Human paternal investment varies both within and between societies, with many
men providing substantial direct or indirect care for offspring, and others providing little to none
(Geary, 2000; Hewlett, 1991). It has been hypothesised that differential cost of reproduction corre-
sponds to disparate preferences for ideal number of children over one’s lifetime – children conceived
across multiple mates (Mulder & Rauch, 2009; Penn & Smith, 2007), but it is not necessarily the
case that within a reproducing couple differential costs explain differences in desired family size
(Moya et al., 2016). For instance, if women experience higher mortality costs following childbirth
than men, some might expect that women would want to have fewer children than men because of
this mortality risk – but men should incorporate the risk of their partner’s mortality when attempting
to optimise reproduction within that long-term pairbond. If a man tries to persuade or exploit a woman
to increase her reproduction to a level that is maladaptive, he will be hurting his reproductive success
within that pairbond as well. Of course, this assumes that people are optimising their fertility, that ‘costs’
are fitness-related and that men have consistent paternity certainty over time within a given pairbond,
none of which are necessarily true (for a more detailed discussion of the factors that influence optimal
male and female reproductive rates, see Moya et al., 2016).
Hypothesis 1: Men have higher ideal family sizes than women, but within reproducing couples, desire
similar numbers of future offspring.
Modelling work suggests that, in humans, where long-term pairbonds are the norm and men and
women’s reproductive success are closely tied, exploiting female reproduction to maladaptive levels
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hurts both male and female fitness, except under very particular circumstances (Barkow & Burley, 1980;
Moya et al., 2016). While the conditions where men exploit female fertility to maladaptive levels are
expected to be limited, we may expect men to prefer women to limit their reproduction more than is
optimal for women. For instance, when paternity certainty decreases with time, men should want
women to reduce their future reproduction more than women do, allocating investments in current off-
spring that he knows are his (Barkow & Burley, 1980; Moya et al., 2016). Based on these models, we
predict that spousal age difference, where men are significantly older than their mates, may be associated
with differential fertility preferences, where men have lower desired fertility than their much younger
wives, since they experience decreasing paternity certainty given mortality risks (Barkow & Burley, 1980).
Hypothesis 2a: Men have lower fertility intentions than women when husbands are significantly older
than their wives.
Fertility preferences depend on socioecological context
It is also possible that differential fertility preferences are not the result of simple sex differences, but the
result of one’s socioecology. Theoretical models of kin conflict suggest that female-biased dispersal (which
is associated with patrilocal postmarital residence) may set up a reproductive conflict where
daughters-in-law have an advantage over older mothers-in-law, since they have more to lose by forgoing
reproduction owing to relatedness asymmetries (Cant & Johnstone, 2008). This model provides an explan-
ation for the higher rate of reproduction among women living patrilocally after marriage (Colleran, 2013;
Sear & Coall, 2011; Sear, Moya, & Mathew, 2013; Snopkowski, Moya, & Sear, 2013; Snopkowski & Sear,
2013). In contrast, when adult children live in communities with their own parents, reproductive conflict
should favour the older generation, since parents have more to lose if they forgo reproduction. From the
adult child’s perspective, they are equally related to a full sibling as a biological offspring and therefore will
be more willing to forgo reproduction (Moya & Sear, 2014). If young women living in patrilocal contexts
can win reproductive conflicts with their mothers-in-law, we might predict that women living patrilocally
have higher desired fertility than their husbands (who experience the same inclusive fitness benefit if they
have a biological offspring or full sibling).
Hypothesis 2b: Women living patrilocally will have higher desired fertility than their husbands.
We can also frame these preferences as the outcome of kin cooperation. Individuals who live near their
own kin may allocate investment towards their indirect fitness (individuals other than biological off-
spring, such as nieces, nephews, siblings, etc.) instead of directing investment exclusively towards bio-
logical offspring. Mathematical modelling has shown that women may delay first births when they
have full siblings to invest in as compared with when they have half siblings (Moya & Sear, 2014).
Women may prefer to have fewer offspring when they live near their kin, which is more likely when
postmarital residence is matrilocal (Johnstone & Cant, 2010). In contrast, if men are living near their
wife’s kin, they may prefer to provide investments in their biological offspring over non-related
individuals.
Hypothesis 2c: Women living matrilocally will have lower desired fertility than their husbands.
Conversely, people may prefer to increase their reproduction when they live near kin if those kin are
likely to act as alloparents or provide support to the reproducing couple (Turke, 1989), or if kin pro-
vide pronatal messages (Newson et al., 2007). Evidence has shown that women are more likely to have
additional offspring when kin provide childcare or other (financial or emotional) support (Kaptijn,
Thomese, van Tilburg, & Liefbroer, 2010; Mathews & Sear, 2013; Schaffnit & Sear, 2017;
Snopkowski & Sear, 2016; Waynforth, 2012). In this situation, we may expect that women have higher
desired fertility in matrilocal contexts or when women live near their kin. The role of patrilocal con-
texts is less clear. If women perceive their affinal kin as providing alloparental (or other) support, then
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women may have similar preferences in matrilocal and patrilocal contexts (both more than in contexts
where women live far from kin).
Hypothesis 2d: Women living near kin will have higher desired fertility than their husbands.
It is hard to predict how men’s fertility preferences may respond to cues of alloparental help. They may
similarly find that kin support increases their desired fertility, or be less sensitive to cues of alloparental
care, particularly in contexts where women take the primary role for direct caregiving. If the prefer-
ences of both men and women move in concert, it will be undetectable in an analysis of differential
fertility preferences.
Fertility preferences as the result of optimisation of non-fitness currencies
Finally, it is possible that differential fertility preferences are the result of people optimising non-fitness
currencies (Moya et al., 2016). Women may prefer to pursue activities beyond motherhood
(McAllister, Gurven, Kaplan, & Stieglitz, 2012; Newson, Postmes, Lea, & Webley, 2005) and mother-
hood may be more incompatible with other activities than fatherhood (Tiefenthaler, 1997). As an
example, in some contexts women may experience higher opportunity costs of reproduction than
men related to employment (Browning, 1992). Career-aspiring women may prefer smaller family
sizes than men, and factors, like education, which provide greater opportunity for employment may
associate with fertility preferences.
Hypothesis 2e: Women with more education will have lower desired fertility than their husbands owing
to increased opportunity costs.
Why might people optimise non-fitness currencies? There are two possibilities: people may simply
pursue activities that are maladaptive given the novel environments we currently live in or people
may pursue activities that were correlated with reproductive success in our evolutionary past, but
are no longer correlated (e.g. status-seeking activities). If women seek to achieve status, then in con-
texts where production of offspring is the only route to status – particularly among affinal kin – they
may prefer to have more offspring (Armitage, 1993). In contexts where wealth, education or career
success leads to status, women may seek these attributes at the expense of reproduction (Shenk,
Kaplan, & Hooper, 2016).
To test the above hypotheses, we will examine fertility intentions among Indonesian couples.
Specifically, we ask: (1) Is there a difference in (a) desired future reproduction and (b) ideal family
size among married men and women in Indonesia (testing Hypothesis 1); and (2) if so, which vari-
ables are associated with differential desired fertility (testing Hypotheses 2a–e)?
Resolution of fertility intentions
Stated fertility intentions are predictive of future fertility, even though they may be imperfect (Schoen,
Astone, Kim, Nathanson, & Fields, 1999; Yeatman, Trinitapoli, & Garver, 2020). We examine how dif-
ferences in fertility intentions among men and women may be resolved over time. We expect that fer-
tility outcomes are the result of negotiations over fertility preferences by wives and husbands, with
possible influences of their kin (Borgerhoff Mulder, 2009). Our third research question asks: how
are fertility intention differences (when they exist) resolved? Under which socioecological contexts
do individuals achieve their preferred number of offspring? Below we discuss hypotheses related to
these questions.
Evidence suggests that fertility is reduced when women have more autonomy (Jejeebhoy, 1991;
Upadhyay et al., 2014), with the assumption that women desire lower fertility and increased autonomy
allows for its achievement.
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Hypothesis 3a: When women have more autonomy, they are more likely to achieve their desired fertility.
Women’s autonomy has been associated with smaller spousal age gap, that is, couples with older hus-
bands and substantially younger wives are associated with reduced female autonomy (Barbieri &
Hertrich, 2005; Carmichael, 2011; cf. Lawson et al., 2020). This leads to Hypothesis 3b.
Hypothesis 3b: When the spousal age gap is larger, men will be more likely to achieve their desired
fertility.
Women’s autonomy may also be associated with their access to natal kin. A frequent empirical finding in
the evolutionary literature is that couples have more offspring when living patrilocally (Colleran, 2013;
Sear & Coall, 2011; Sear et al., 2013; Snopkowski et al., 2013; Snopkowski & Sear, 2013). This could
represent sexual conflict over family size that is resolved in favour of the husband’s preference – with
the assumption that men and their kin prefer women to have more offspring than they want
(Leonetti, Nath, & Hemam, 2007) and that in these contexts men are able to achieve their preference.
Empirical evidence from Karachi, Pakistan has shown that mothers-in-law have higher stated fertility
preferences than their daughters-in-law (Kadir, Fikree, Khan, & Sajan, 2003) and other research has
found that women are less likely to use contraceptives when their husbands or mothers-in-law oppose
their use (Blackstone, Nwaozuru, & Iwelunmor, 2017; Onwuzurike & Uzochukwu, 2001; Qutub, 1995).
Women may be able to achieve their desired fertility preference when they live near their natal kin, while
men achieve their desired preference when they live near their kin.
Hypothesis 3c: Women living matrilocally (or near their kin) will be more likely to achieve their desired
fertility, while women living patrilocally (or away from their natal kin) will be less likely to achieve their
desired fertility.
Different fertility preferences may also be resolved in the direction of the more normative behaviour.
Previous research has shown that couples are more likely to refrain from having additional children in
low-fertility contexts if couples disagree about wanting another child, while couples in high-fertility
contexts are more likely to have additional children if couples disagree about wanting another child
(DaVanzo, Peterson, & Jones, 2003; Voas, 2003). This leads to Hypothesis 3d.
Hypothesis 3d: In low fertility contexts, couples will be less likely to have more children if they disagree
over whether to have additional offspring.
Prior research
Several prior studies have examined family size preferences, sexual conflict and reproductive outcomes. A
study of the Mpimbwe, a horticultural society in Western Tanzania, found that men desire more children
than women, but having a consistent husband does not result in higher overall fertility or number of sur-
viving offspring for women approximately 10 years later (Borgerhoff Mulder, 2009). A survey of parents
fromYokohama City, Japan found that, while women reported higher costs of childcare, there was no con-
flict over ideal family size and bothmothers and fathers reported that they had equal power tomake repro-
ductive decisions (Morita, Ohtsuki, & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 2016). A study of the Tsimane, a lowland South
Amerindian forager–horticulturalist group in Bolivia, found that women tend to have more children than
their stated ideal familysize, but that coupleswhere the husbandwants additional children and thewife does
not are notmore likely to have additional children than couples who agree (McAllister et al., 2012). A study
of the Yoruba of Nigeria found that the fertility desires of both partners are important predictors of overall
fertility and thatwhen spouses disagree, intermediate fertility tends to be the result (Bankole, 1995).Overall,
previous studies suggest relatively tepid evidence for husbands achieving their fertility preferences at the
expense of their wives.
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Methods
We utilise data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) to examine fertility preferences and reso-
lution among Indonesian couples. The IFLS is a longitudinal survey that collects individual- and
community-level information on fertility, education, employment, migration and health
(Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995; Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al., 2004; Strauss, Witoelar,
& Sikoki, 2016; Strauss, Witoelar, Sikoki, & Wattie, 2009). Surveys were conducted across five
waves: collected in 1993/1994, 1997/1998, 2000, 2007/2008 and 2014/2015. IFLS data, which is man-
aged by the RAND Corporation, is publicly available, but cannot be distributed by users and requires
registration at: https://www.rand.org/well-being/social-and-behavioral-policy/data/FLS/IFLS/access.
html. The survey represents an area that includes 83% of Indonesia (13 provinces found on the islands
of Java, Sumatra, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and Sulawesi). Small provinces and provinces
that were politically unstable at the time of the first interview were not sampled. A total of 7224 house-
holds were surveyed in 1993/1994 (Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000). In each subsequent wave, the ori-
ginal household members who completed a detailed interview in 1993/1994 were re-interviewed and
household members who did not complete a detailed interview have been systematically added
throughout the waves (Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al., 2004, 2009). When households
split, both households are interviewed in subsequent waves. A total of ∼15,900 households were inter-
viewed in 2014/2015. Analyses were conducted in STATA v. 13. The STATA do file is available at:
https://osf.io/ygpmh/?view_only=872ec8eeb9a142bdb81cc8d7b9293c3b.
Cultural context
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and is extremely diverse, with over 300
ethnic groups utilising varying kinship systems (Rammohan & Johar, 2009). For example, the
Balinese people, who practise Hinduism, tend to be patrilocal (Jensen & Suryani, 1992), the
Minangkabau people of West Sumatra are matrilineal and matrilocal (Krier, 2000), and other ethnic
groups, like the Sumbawanese and the Bima-Dompu, are multilocal (Lebar, 1972; Murdock, 1967;
Snopkowski, Moya, & Sear, 2014). Over the past 50 years, Indonesia has experienced a dramatic reduc-
tion in fertility. The average number of children born per woman (total fertility rate) has fallen from
5.7 in 1960 and 2.8 in 1993 to 2.4 in 2015 (The World Bank, 2019). During this time, there was eco-
nomic growth, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s (van der Eng, 1992), and structural changes
occurred in agriculture and manufacturing (Soesastro & Chatib, 2005). A major economic downturn
occurred in 1997–1998, known as the Asian Financial Crisis (Elias & Noone, 2011). Indonesia experi-
enced rapid urbanisation with 17.1% of people living in urban areas in 1960 transitioning to 52.6% in
2009 (Lewis, 2013). Indonesia is the largest Muslim majority country in the world, with 86% of par-
ticipants in 1993/1994 identifying as Muslim. Arranged marriage was once common (over 50% of
rural women born before 1953) and was associated with high divorce rates and self-choice remarriage,
but has become less frequent with time (Heaton, Cammack, & Young, 2001; Malhotra, 1991). In the
decades preceding the IFLS, Indonesia experienced a dramatic increase in primary school attendance
and developed a state-sponsored family planning programme (Molyneaux & Gertler, 2000). Indonesia
has nearly universal marriage (97% of women in the IFLS are married by age 30). Evidence from the
Indonesia Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey suggests low rates of non-marital fertility (only a
few pregnancies outside of marriage were reported out of over 8000 women interviewed) as pregnancy
among unmarried women is socially unacceptable (BPS Statistics Indonesia and Macro International,
2008).
Samples
We utilise two samples throughout. The first is the sample of couples (married once, monogamously,
wife is 35 years old or younger) who report their desired number of future offspring (n = 9655) to
examine questions related to desired fertility. By limiting our sample to couples in their first marriage,
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we assume that both the wife and husband have the same number of current children (given low rates
of non-marital fertility), allowing us to compare how many additional children they desire. We restrict
the age of women to allow time for future fertility. Including women up to 40 or 45 primarily increases
the number of couples who do not desire additional children. The second sample includes couples
(married once, monogamously) who disagree on the number of future offspring desired. There
were 3536 couples who had different preferences for future offspring. Of these, 1949 couples remained
married, reported birth information and were followed for a minimum of 7 years. This can be further
divided into 170 couples who had a number of children that fell between the wife’s and husband’s
preferences and 1779 couples where one person ‘achieved’ their desired fertility.
Data analysis
To determine whether there is a difference in desired future reproduction among married men and
women, we examine couples to compare their answers to ‘do you personally wish to have another
child (besides the children you already have)?’ and ‘how many (more) children do you wish to
have?’ Starting in 1997/1998, participants could answer with ‘Up to God’. For these analyses, we
include couples the first time they are asked, where both answered with a numerical value. We conduct
a one-sample test of proportions to see if couples are evenly split (50%/50%) in which partner (wife or
husband) prefers more offspring.
While ideal family size may be a less reliable indicator of future fertility, we can also examine whether
there are differences between men and women. In this case, we do not need to limit the sample to those
who are currently married, although the question was only asked of those who were ever married.
Participants are included the first time they answer the question, regardless of their number of marriages
or polygyny status. A potential response to the question, ‘if you could choose exactly the number of chil-
dren to have in your whole life, how many would that be’ is ‘up to God’. This makes analysis more chal-
lenging, but we can examine how this changes for men and women across time, to determine whether
there are differential preferences for ideal fertility. We also conduct a t-test to compare the ideal family
size across men and women for those who provide numeric answers.
We conduct a multinomial logistic regression model to determine which attributes correspond to
having the same preference for future offspring compared with different preferences – either the hus-
band preferring more future children or the wife preferring more future children. We examined the
following predictors: age difference between partners (Hypothesis 2a), postmarital residence
(Hypotheses 2b–d), proximity to kin (Hypothesis 2d) and wife’s education (Hypothesis 2e).
Postmarital residence is defined as neolocal if the couple did not live with either the wife’s or hus-
band’s parents after marriage, matrilocal if they lived with the wife’s mother or father after marriage
and patrilocal if they lived with the husband’s mother or father after marriage. Proximity to kin is a
categorical variable indicative of the presence of kin at the time of interview (when the couple reports
their preference for future offspring). Given that postmarital residence may be a proxy for kin avail-
ability, we use both measures. Our hypotheses are only explicitly about kin availability in Hypothesis
2d, but we believe that hypotheses 2b and 2c could also be framed as hypotheses about kin availability
(or lack thereof). The categories of kin availability indicate whether at least one of the wife’s parents or
husband’s parents live in the same village (co-residence is also included). The options include: neither
set of parent(s) are living in the same village, the wife’s parent(s) live in the same village, the husband’s
parent(s) live in the same village or both the husband’s and wife’s parent(s) live in the same village.
Parent’s location was not collected in 1997/1998, so we run analyses both with and without the kin
availability measure. Wife’s education is defined as a categorical variable indicating the highest level
of education achieved, including none, grade school, junior high, secondary school, vocational second-
ary school and postsecondary education.
We include a variety of control variables in our multinomial logistic regression model that may
influence desired fertility (DaVanzo et al., 2003). We control for household wealth. The household
wealth variable was constructed as a factor of the number of rooms in the house, floor type, toilet
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type, electricity status, type of outer wall, whether the house has a telephone (1993/1994) or a televi-
sion (1997/1998, 2000, 2007/2008, 2014/2015) and monthly household rent (or amount family would
have to pay if renting their home; in 2014/2015). This variable has a mean of approximately 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 in each wave. Larger values are indicative of wealthier households. We also
include the difference between husband and wife’s education level as husband’s education may be
important in addition to wife’s education, but we cannot include both variables in the model given
multicollinearity. Positive values of this variable indicate that the husband has more education than
the wife. Wife’s age at marriage, arranged marriage status, number of currently living children and
wife’s age at interview are also included as possible control variables given that they may influence
how many future children couples want. Finally, religion, region, urban vs. rural residence and
wave of data collection are also controlled for given fertility differences across these factors.
To examine who achieves their desired fertility, we use the sample of couples (married once, mon-
ogamously) who had divergent preferences for future offspring. We monitor them for as long as pos-
sible by identifying the most recent wave with data on fertility where they remain married (to each
other, monogamously), but requiring a minimum duration of 7 years for follow-up to determine
who was able to achieve their desired fertility preference (we also examine a cut-off of at least 10
years as a sensitivity analysis). In every wave of data collection, women respond to questions about
their number of live births since the previous wave. We include all live births as an indication of
the couple’s fertility during the follow-up period. We code the couple by who ‘achieved’ their desired
fertility. As an example, if a couple had divergent fertility preferences, where the wife wanted two chil-
dren, but her husband only wanted one, we code the husband as achieving his fertility preference if the
couple has zero or one child after the maximum duration of follow-up. We code the wife as achieving
her fertility preference if the couple has two or more children over the same time period. We analyse
this using a logistic regression model (the event indicates that the wife achieved her desired fertility)
and include the same predictors as listed above: spousal age difference (Hypothesis 3b) and postmar-
ital residence/kin availability (Hypothesis 3c), and add wife’s autonomy (Hypothesis 3a).
Wife’s autonomy is the average of her autonomy in each wave across the range of years that she is
surveyed. Women’s autonomy is measured by responses to the following questions:
In your household, who makes decisions about: (a) your child’s health, (b) large expensive pur-
chases for the household, (c) whether you work, (d) whether you (and your spouse) use contracep-
tion and (e) your time spent socialising.
Women report who makes these decisions and can report multiple people. Autonomy is measured as
the average of decisions the woman is at least partially involved in, coded as 2 = woman alone makes
the decision, 1 = woman makes decision with others, 0 = woman does not make the decision. For any
decision that may be irrelevant, such as child’s health for women without children, we take the average
of decisions that remain. This measure was collected beginning in 1997/1998. For kin availability, there
are a lot of possible combinations as we follow couples across the waves of data collection. We categor-
ise this variable into seven categories based on original data collection and final follow-up: (1) no kin
present (at original data collection nor at final follow-up); (2) wife’s parent(s) live in village (both time
points); (3) husband’s parent(s) live in village (both time points); (4) both sets of parent(s) live in vil-
lage (both time points); (5) no kin lived in village originally, but kin lived in village by the final
follow-up; (6) kin lived in village originally and at follow-up, but which parents had changed; and
(7) lived in same village as kin originally, but did not by the final follow-up.
We continue to include the control variables: household wealth (averaged across waves where the
couple is followed), wife’s education, difference in husband and wife’s education, religion, region,
wife’s age at marriage, number of living children (at first interview), arranged marriage status,
urban vs. rural residence and duration of time between original interview and maximum possible
follow-up. We also include an indicator for whether the couple had experienced the death of a
child during the follow-up period since prior research has found that death of a child significantly
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increases the likelihood of another birth (DaVanzo et al., 2003) and whether the wife was the one who
wanted more offspring initially, as there may be a tendency to have fewer children in low-fertility con-
texts when conflict exists (Voas, 2003). We exclude woman’s age at interview because it is correlated
with wife’s age at marriage, since women typically enter the dataset once they are married.
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our two samples; couples who report their fertility inten-
tions (labelled ‘Fertility intentions sample’) and those that are followed to determine the resolution of
their differential intentions (labelled ‘Fertility resolutions sample’).
Question 1: Is there a difference in (a) desired future reproduction and (b) ideal family size among
married men and women in Indonesia?
Figure 1 presents the preferences for desired future children for couples who fit our sampling criteria
(first marriage, monogamous, wife 35 years of age or younger) as a scatter plot (Figure 1a) and a bar
chart (Figure 1b). These results show that approximately 64.8% of couples have the same preference
for future offspring. An additional 20.7% of couples have husbands who prefer more future offspring
than their wives, and 14.5% have wives who prefer more future offspring than their husbands. When
differences do occur, 72% of couples exhibit a difference of one child. This suggests that most couples
do not report conflict over their future fertility preferences and when different preferences arise, they
are typically small (see Supplementary Materials Table S1 for a frequency distribution of fertility pre-
ferences). A one-sample test of proportions indicates that, among couples who have differing prefer-
ences for future offspring, the proportion of couples where husbands prefer more offspring than wives
is statistically greater than 50%, z(3823) = 10.75, p < 0.001. This remains if we look at each wave sep-
arately, where husbands prefer more future offspring than wives in approximately 58.7% of couples
where differences occur.
We can also examine ideal family size, which will depend less on the number of children couples
already have. Figure 2 displays the ideal family size for men and women. This figure shows that women
prefer to have one child at slightly higher rates than men, both prefer having two children at the same
rate – which is the most frequent response for both men and women – and at higher-order births
(three or more), men exhibit the preference slightly more often than woman. Participants could
respond that they had no ideal family size and that it is ‘up to God’. We see that women are slightly
more likely than men to respond that their ideal family size is ‘up to God’. A t-test comparing the
averages of men and women who report a numeric value shows that the ideal family size is signifi-
cantly different. Men (mean, M = 3.04, standard deviation, SD = 2.06) report a significantly higher
ideal family size than women (M = 2.90, SD = 1.67), t(33,159) =−6.32, p < 0.001. The distribution
of ideal family size changes quite substantially across waves (see Supplementary Materials
Figure S1), where the number of people who report that it is ‘up to God’ declines from about
33.6% in 1997/1998 to 3.5% in 2014/2015. In contrast, the number of people who report two as
the ideal family size goes from 27.2% in 1997/1998 to 55.4% in 2014/2015. There is clearly a shift
towards an ideal family size of two.
Question 2: Who prefers more offspring, and which socioecological variables are associated with
differential desired fertility?
Table 2 presents the results of our multinomial logistic regression model, where our effect sizes
represent relative risk ratios (RRR). Our reference category is couples who agree on the number of
future offspring. If we first examine our predictions, we see that the wife–husband age difference
and postmarital residence are not predictive of conflict over desired fertility. Kin availability is predict-
ive of the wife preferring to have more future children. If she lives in a community with her husband’s
parent(s), she is significantly more likely to desire greater numbers of offspring than her husband
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on two samples













Desired number of future children
(women)
1.25 1.11 0–21 0% n/a
Desired number of future children
(men)
1.37 1.26 0–29 0% n/a
Age difference between partners
(husband age−wife age)
4.32 4.12 −11–44 0% 4.29 4.11 −9–30 0%
Women’s autonomy (average
across waves)
n/a 1.05 0.2 0–1.8 0.1%
Household wealth 0 0.96 −4.7–3.2 2.4% 0.08 0.81 −3.09–2.21 0.3%
Education difference between
partners (husband’s education
level – wife’s education level)
0.13 1.19 −4–4 1.6% 0.15 1.25 −4–4 0.8%
Wife’s age at marriage 20.58 4.04 0–37 0.7% 20.66 4.03 7–34 <0.1%
Number of currently living children 1.38 1.09 0–8 0.7% 1.36 0.98 0–6 <0.1%
Wife’s age at interview 26.1 4.81 11–35 0% n/a
Duration of follow-up n/a 12.51 5.47 7–21 0%
Postmarital residence 1.8% 1.6%
Neolocal 2884 30.4% 525 30.0%
Matrilocal 3695 39.0% 721 41.2%
Patrilocal 2902 30.6% 505 28.8%
Kin availability 11.7% 23.3%
Neither wife’s nor husband’s
parents live in village/at start
and end for follow-up
1909 22.40% 224 16.42%
Wife’s parent(s) live in village/at
start and end












Husband’s parent(s) live in village/
at start and end
2397 28.1% 221 16.2%
Both wife’s and husband’s parent
(s) live in village/at start and end
1859 21.8% 176 12.9%
No kin at start, live in same village
as kin at end
n/a 58 4.3%
Live in same village with kin at
beginning and change to some
new combination of kin
n/a 172 12.6%
Lived in same village as kin at start,
but no kin at end
n/a 303 22.2%
Wife’s education 0.8% 0.6%
None 278 2.9% 57 3.2%
Grade school 3050 31.8% 640 36.2%
Junior high 2386 24.9% 419 23.7%
Secondary school 1756 18.3% 262 14.8%
Vocational secondary school 1164 12.1% 218 12.3%
Post-secondary school 947 9.9% 173 9.8%
Arranged marriage 1.7% 1.4%
Yes 878 9.2% 186 10.6%
No 8617 90.8% 1568 89.4%
Urban/rural residence 0% 0%
Rural 4642 47.8% 868 48.8%
Urban 5012 52.2% 911 51.2%
Religion 0.1% 0%
Islam 8674 89.9% 1615 90.8%
Protestant 337 3.5% 67 3.8%
Catholic 120 1.2% 21 1.2%






















Buddhist 25 0.3% 3 0.2%
Other 6 0.1% 1 <0.1%
Region 0% 0%
Sumatra 2247 23.3% 439 24.7%
Java 5232 54.2% 953 53.6%
Bali and Nusa Tenggara 1186 12.3% 189 10.6%
Kalimantan 496 5.1% 100 5.6%
Sulawesi 493 5.1% 98 5.5%
Wave 0%





Child died n/a 0%
No 1716 96.5%
Yes 63 3.5%
Who prefers more offspring n/a 0%
Wife 781 43.9%
Husband 998 56.1%
Fertility intentions sample: sample of couples in first marriage, married monogamously, wife aged 35 or younger, who report number of future offspring desired.
Fertility resolutions sample: sample of couples who are followed owing to divergent fertility preferences where one person can be identified as ‘achieving’ their desired fertility. Couples are followed for at least 7
years, must remain married (to each other), and report their birth information.












compared with women living in a community without kin (RRR = 1.22, 95% CI [1.00, 1.48]). The
effect of having her own parent(s) in the village is quite similar (RRR = 1.20, 95% CI [0.99, 1.46]),
where the presence of her own parent(s) is also predictive of her wanting more offspring than her
Figure 1. (a) Scatterplot of wife and husband’s desired number of future offspring for couples in their first marriage (monogam-
ously married, wife aged 35 years or younger), where each dot represents one couple, using a ‘jitter’ function so that dots overlap
minimally. Each box represents a possible outcome, with the most frequent outcome corresponding to both wife and husband
desiring one future offspring. We censor the data at six future offspring (all those with preferences above six are grouped into
the six category). (b) The frequency of couples that exhibit particular preferences for future children. The legend categories indicate
the preference for future children by each partner. For example, ‘0 0’ indicates that both partners want zero future children. The
category ‘0 1’ means that one partner wants zero future children while the other wants one more child. The figure then separates
by which partner prefers more future children (left and right columns corresponding to husband prefers more future offspring than
his wife and wife prefers more future offspring than her husband, respectively). In the centre column, couples desire the same num-
ber of future children – ranging from zero to more than two (‘0 0’ to ‘>2 >2’). Categories with ‘>’ indicate groups. For instance, ‘0 > 1’
refers to all couples where one partner desires zero future offspring and the other partner wants more than one future offspring.
See Supplementary Materials Table S1 for a frequency distribution of desired future offspring by couples.
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husband. Having both sets of parent(s) around is not associated with conflict over desired fertility.
Wife’s education is associated with reduced conflict over desired future fertility, where women with
secondary school education are less likely to exhibit preferences for more future children than their
husbands compared with women with no education (RRR = 0.62, 95% CI [0.40, 0.96]). If we examine
our control variables, we see that couples are more likely to agree on the number of future offspring
when the couple:(1) practices Hinduism; (2) lives on Java; and (3) has more living children. Couples
are less likely to agree on future fertility in 2014/2015, as there is an increased likelihood that men want
more offspring than their wives and that wives want more offspring than their husbands. If we exam-
ine the model predicting the relative risk of the husband preferring more future offspring than the
wife, we see that living in an urban area is associated with an increased likelihood that husbands
want more children (RRR=1.14, 95% CI [1.00, 1.29]). Since kin availability was not available in the
1997/1998 wave, we report the multinomial logistic model without kin availability in
Supplementary Materials Table S2. The results are substantively similar, except that husbands are
less likely to desire more future offspring than their wives in 1993/1994 and 1997/1998.
Question 3: How are these differences (when they exist) resolved? Under which socioecological con-
texts do individuals achieve their preferred number of offspring?
Of the 1949 couples who disagreed on the number of future offspring (and met our other sampling
criteria, see ‘Samples’), there were 1098 (56%) couples where the wife wanted fewer future offspring
than her husband and 851 (44%) where the wife wanted more future offspring than her husband.
Examining these couples, we see that in about 48% of couples the wife achieved her desired future
fertility, while in only 43% of couples did the husband achieve his desired future fertility (see
Table 3). The remaining 9% of couples had an intermediate number of offspring between their stated
preferences. We can also see that the person who wants fewer offspring is more likely to achieve their
preference: in 54% of couples when the wife wants fewer offspring and 53% of couples when the hus-
band wants fewer offspring.
If we examine the couples where one person ‘achieves their desired fertility’, we can examine
whether there are particular traits about a couple that leads the wife or husband to achieve their
Figure 2. The proportion of responses for ideal family size by men and women. People with an ideal family size of more than 10
children are grouped into ‘>10’. ‘Up to God’ is also a valid response.
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Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression model predicting conflict over desired future family size. The reference category is
couples who prefer the same number of future children
Husband prefers more future
children
Wife prefers more future
children
RRR SE p-Value RRR SE p-Value
Husband–wife age difference 0.99 0.01 0.46 1.01 0.01 0.17
Post-marital residence (reference = neolocal)
Matrilocal 0.99 0.07 0.86 1.00 0.08 0.99
Patrilocal 0.99 0.08 0.92 0.98 0.09 0.82
Kin availability (reference = no parents in village)
Wife’s parent(s) in village 1.08 0.09 0.35 1.20 0.12 0.06
Husband’s parent(s) in village 0.95 0.08 0.52 1.22 0.12 0.04
Both sets of parent(s) live in village 0.87 0.08 0.13 0.98 0.11 0.82
Wife’s education (reference = no school)
Grade school 1.20 0.26 0.39 0.77 0.15 0.19
Junior high 1.10 0.24 0.68 0.66 0.14 0.05
Secondary school 1.27 0.29 0.30 0.62 0.14 0.03
Vocational secondary school 1.28 0.31 0.30 0.61 0.15 0.04
Post-secondary 1.42 0.35 0.16 0.80 0.20 0.36
Household wealth 1.03 0.04 0.43 0.99 0.04 0.86
Husband–wife educational difference 1.02 0.03 0.42 1.01 0.03 0.68
Wife’s age at marriage 1.00 0.01 0.69 1.01 0.01 0.55
Arranged marriage (reference = not arranged) 1.10 0.12 0.37 1.07 0.13 0.58
Number of living children 0.96 0.04 0.32 0.85 0.04 <0.01
Wife’s age (at interview) 1.00 0.01 0.80 1.01 0.01 0.19
Religion (reference = Islam)
Protestant 1.09 0.17 0.55 1.12 0.19 0.51
Catholic 0.79 0.20 0.34 0.59 0.19 0.11
Hinduism 0.71 0.11 0.03 0.59 0.11 0.01
Buddhism 1.99 0.96 0.15 0.37 0.38 0.34
Other 2.51 3.62 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.99
Region (reference = Sumatra)
Java 0.90 0.07 0.15 0.73 0.06 <0.01
Bali and Nusa Tenggara 1.17 0.13 0.17 1.00 0.13 0.98
Kalimantan 0.90 0.13 0.46 0.75 0.12 0.08
Sulawesi 1.11 0.16 0.46 0.90 0.15 0.51
Urban (reference = rural) 1.14 0.07 0.05 1.08 0.08 0.30
Wave reported preference (reference = 2000)
1993 0.80 0.08 0.03 0.88 0.10 0.27
(Continued )
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preference. Table 4 presents the results of our logistic regression model where our outcome is the wife
achieved her desired fertility (1) or the husband achieved his desired fertility (0). Given that kin avail-
ability is not available for all waves (excluded in 1997/1998), we present the results with kin availability
(A) and without (B). The results show that if the wife initially desired more children than her husband,
she is significantly less likely to achieve her desired fertility (OR = 0.427, 95% CI [0.34, 0.54]). Counter
to predictions, whether the couple lived matrilocally, patrilocally or neolocally does not have a signifi-
cant effect on whether the wife or husband achieves their desired fertility, nor does the local availability
of kin. Similarly, women’s autonomy and education do not have significant effects on her ability to
achieve her desired number of offspring. The age difference between husbands and wives is significant
in Model B, but in the opposite direction than predicted, where a larger difference between husband
and wife’s age is associated with the wife being more likely to achieve her desired number of offspring
(OR = 1.03, 95% CI [1.00, 1.06]). Couples that report their marriage as arranged by others (in Model
A) have a reduced likelihood that the wife achieves her preference (OR = 0.67, 95% CI [0.45, 1.00]),
which may support hypotheses related to autonomy if arranged marriage is indicative of low auton-
omy of women. Women who report an older age at marriage are more likely to achieve their desired
number of future offspring (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.99, 1.07]). We exclude the results from region, reli-
gion and urban/rural status (for space), but couples residing in Sulawesi are significantly more likely to
be associated with the wife achieving her desired number of offspring. We can also check the sensi-
tivity of these results by examining only couples who have been tracked for 10 or more years. Sample
size falls dramatically (by about half), but results show that the effect of the wife being less likely to
achieve her desired fertility when her preference for children is higher no longer holds (OR = 1.10, 95%
CI [0.79, 1.52]) and the effect of arranged marriage is much reduced (OR = 0.96, 95% CI [0.63, 1.45],
see Supplementary Materials Table S3). This suggests that the effect of the person who wants fewer
Table 2. (Continued.)
Husband prefers more future
children
Wife prefers more future
children
RRR SE p-Value RRR SE p-Value
2007 1.14 0.09 0.11 1.08 0.10 0.42
2014 1.45 0.12 <0.01 1.30 0.13 0.01
Constant 0.27 0.09 <0.01 0.24 0.08 <0.01
Note: even though ‘husband prefers more future children’ and ‘wife prefers more future children’ are presented in different columns, they
were all included in one multinomial logistic regression model. RRR, Relative risk ratio; SE, standard error; n = 7928.
Bold values indicates p < 0.10.
Table 3. Of couples that disagree over future fertility, who achieves their desired fertility after at least 7 years?
W < H W > H Total
Wife achieves desired fertility 593 (54%) 335 (39%) 928 (48%)
Compromise 100 (9%) 70 (8%) 170 (9%)
Husband achieves desired fertility 405 (37%) 446 (53%) 851 (43%)
1098 (100%) 851 (100%) 1949 (100%)
W < H represents couples where the wife desires fewer future offspring than her husband, W > H represents couples where the wife desires
more future offspring than her husband. Wife achieves desired fertility includes women who had their desired number of offspring or fewer if
they are in the W < H category, or the number of women who have their desired number of offspring or more if they are in the W > H category.
The same criteria hold for ‘husband achieves desired fertility’. Compromise indicates couples where they had a difference in desired fertility
of greater than one offspring and had a number in between the wife and husband’s desired future fertility.
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children being able to achieve their desired fertility outcome may be partially explained by not being
able to follow couples for a sufficient duration and that arranged marriage effects are not robust. Other
effects become less significant, probably owing to reduced statistical power, but their effect sizes
Table 4. Logistic regression model predicted: wife achieves desired fertility (1) vs. husband achieves his desired fertility (0).
Couples are included if they were tracked for 7 or more years and if the couple was in their first marriage and remained
married. Model A includes the kin availability variable (which is not measured for people who first answered the survey in
1997). Model B excludes this variable and therefore has a larger sample size
A. Model with kin
availability






Husband–wife age difference 1.02 0.02 0.28 1.03 0.01 0.05
Postmarital residence (reference = neolocal)
Matrilocal 1.10 0.17 0.51 1.08 0.13 0.54
Patrilocal 0.94 0.15 0.72 0.88 0.12 0.35
Kin availability (reference = no kin at start or end)
Wife’s parent(s) live in village at start and end 1.17 0.26 0.48
Husband’s parent(s) live in village at start and end 1.10 0.24 0.66
Both sets of parent(s) live in village at start and end 0.88 0.21 0.50
No kin at start, live in same village as kin at end 0.63 0.20 0.14
Live with kin at beginning and change to a new
combination of kin
1.15 0.27 0.54
Lived in same village as kin at start, but no kin at
end
0.92 0.18 0.68
Women’s autonomy 0.96 0.30 0.90 0.89 0.22 0.64
Household wealth 0.89 0.08 0.19 0.90 0.07 0.20
Wife’s education
Grade school 0.96 0.34 0.92 1.08 0.32 0.80
Junior high 0.99 0.37 0.98 1.03 0.32 0.92
Secondary school 0.95 0.39 0.89 1.11 0.38 0.77
Vocational secondary school 1.05 0.45 0.90 1.17 0.42 0.66
Post-secondary school 1.04 0.48 0.93 1.43 0.55 0.35
Husband–wife educational difference 0.94 0.05 0.30 0.96 0.05 0.38
Wife’s age at marriage 1.03 0.02 0.09 1.03 0.02 0.07
Number of living kids at first interview 0.98 0.06 0.76 1.05 0.06 0.37
Arranged marriage (reference = not arranged) 0.67 0.14 0.05 0.84 0.15 0.31
Duration followed up 1.01 0.01 0.58 1.00 0.01 0.99
Child died 1.79 0.59 0.08 1.36 0.37 0.26
Wife desires more offspring 0.43 0.05 <0.01 0.52 0.05 <0.01
Constant 0.65 0.46 0.54 0.57 0.31 0.30
n 1318 1724
Note: models control for region, religion and urban/rural residence.
Bold values indicates p < 0.10.
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remain similar. As wife’s age at marriage increases, the odds that she achieves her desired fertility
increase (OR = 1.04, 95% CI [0.99, 1.10]) and spousal age difference, where the difference in ages
between spouses is greater, is associated with a greater likelihood that the wife achieves her fertility
preference (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [1.00, 1.07]).
Discussion
In this paper, we seek to understand the factors that influence conflict over family size and its reso-
lution in Indonesia. A summary of our research questions, hypotheses and results can be found in
Table 5. Our findings show that the majority of couples have similar preferences for future offspring,
but when differences occur, men are statistically more likely to prefer greater numbers of future
Table 5. Summary of research questions, related hypotheses and results
Research question Hypothesis Evidence supports hypothesis?
1. Is there a difference in desired
future reproduction and ideal
family size among married men
and women in Indonesia?
1: Men have higher ideal family
sizes than woman, but within
reproducing couples, desire a
similar number of future
offspring
Men have slightly higher ideal
family sizes, but also are
slightly more likely to have
higher desired future fertility
within couples
2. Which socioecological variables
are associated with differential
desired fertility?
2a: Men have lower fertility
intentions than women when
husbands are significantly older
than their wives
No
2b: Women living patrilocally will
have higher desired fertility than
their husbands
Yes, when living in a village with
husband’s kin
2c: Women living matrilocally will
have lower desired fertility than
their husbands
No
2d: Women living near kin will have
higher desired fertility than their
husbands
Yes
2e: Women with more education
will have lower desired fertility
than their husbands
Yes, for women with secondary
school level education
3. How are fertility intention
differences resolved? Under
which socioecological contexts do
individuals achieve their preferred
number of offspring?
3a: When women have more
autonomy, they are more likely
to achieve their desired fertility.
No
3b: When the spousal age gap is
larger, men will be more likely to
achieve their desired fertility
No
3c: Women living matrilocally (or
near kin) will be more likely to
achieve their desired fertility,
while women living patrilocally
(or away from kin) will be less
likely to achieve their desired
fertility
No
3d: In low fertility contexts, couples
will be less likely to have more
children if they disagree over
when to have additional
offspring
Yes, but only when restricted to
seven years of follow-up
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offspring. The factors that influence conflict within couples include whether the couple lives in the
same village as the wife’s or husband’s parent(s). Women are more likely to prefer a greater number
of future offspring than their husbands when they live in the same village as the wife’s or husband’s
parent(s). The relative risk ratio of 1.2 corresponds to women desiring more future children than their
husbands about 14% of the time when they live in a village without either of their parents, but 17% of
the time when they live in a community with either the husband’s or wife’s parents. Increased educa-
tion for women is associated with a reduced likelihood that women want more children than their
husbands, where a baseline rate of 14% of women drops to about 8.7% of women with secondary
school education levels wanting more future children than their husbands (after controlling for cov-
ariates). We find that few variables significantly predict who will achieve their desired fertility. Overall,
the person who wants fewer offspring tends to achieve their preference slightly more often (at least
when follow-up is limited to seven years) and wives are slightly more likely to achieve their
preference than husbands. Additionally, marrying at a later age or a larger spousal age gap are both
associated with an increased likelihood that a woman achieves her desired offspring number.
When reflecting on these results in light of our original hypotheses, we find that, on average, men
are more likely to prefer greater numbers of future offspring than women, but the majority of couples
agree on future reproduction. The result is mirrored in ideal family size, where there are minor differ-
ences between men and women, with slightly higher ideal family sizes by 0.14 children on average
among men. So, counter to our original hypothesis, we do not find differences between ideal family
size and desired future fertility. It is impossible to know how people interpret these questions and
whether they think only about children within their current partnership or across multiple partners
when answering these questions. Our results do not find differences across these measures, providing
suggestive evidence that people perceive these questions in similar ways. Overall, we find small, but
significant, differential fertility preferences within a minority of couples.
We also do not find evidence that men have different fertility intentions than woman when they are
significantly older, which we predicted based on their decreasing paternity certainty given higher mor-
tality risks. Perhaps our prediction should have focused on different preferences for interbirth interval.
Women, who because of their younger age, can expect to live more future years than their much older
spouses, may wish to have offspring at longer birth intervals, spacing out births over their reproductive
life. Men, who are older and have fewer future years of life, may prefer to have offspring at a faster rate
so as to utilise their wives’ reproductive resources before their death. In this case, we might not observe
differences in desired future fertility, just differences in ideal birth intervals. Future research should
examine whether different interbirth intervals are found for couples with large spousal age gaps.
When we examine predictions based on socioecological contexts, we find evidence that women liv-
ing near their husband’s kin have higher desired fertility than their husbands. This may reflect inter-
generational reproductive conflict (Cant & Johnstone, 2008), where younger women who live without
kin nearby prefer to increase effort towards direct reproduction. However, our results also show a simi-
lar effect of women desiring more offspring when they live in the same village as their parent(s). This
is counter to Hypothesis 2c: Women living matrilocally will have lower desired fertility than their hus-
band but does conform to Hypothesis 2d: Women living near kin will have higher desired fertility than
their husbands. This suggests that women desire more offspring than their husbands when they have
kin (either their parents or their husband’s parents) nearby to help them with allocare or provide
financial or emotional support, or are responding to pronatal messaging from kin. An alternative
hypothesis is that women who want to have more offspring opt to live near kin. Our results do not
support the idea that women are exploited when they live near their husband’s kin into having off-
spring that they do not want to have. Of course, it is possible that women hide their true preferences
or report what they view as their inevitable reproductive outcomes.
The results show a significant effect of kin availability, but not postmarital residence. It is possible
that postmarital residence, which looks at co-residence immediately following marriage, is a less
appropriate measure than local kin availability at the time of interview, given that couples may
have already relocated or that kin living nearby may be more indicative of alloparental help, support
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or pronatal messaging than strictly limiting to co-resident kin. The finding that kin availability of both
sets of parents does not significantly predict differential preferences for offspring is surprising given
that one would expect if each set of parents by themselves increases the likelihood that women
want more children than their husbands, then combined we should see at least similar effects. In real-
ity, we see that, when couples live in communities with both sets of parents, they are slightly more
likely to agree on the number of offspring (66% of couples agree, compared with about 62% in
other kin categories) and the number of children they want tends to be slightly higher overall. For
instance, couples that want more than five additional offspring always live in communities with
both sets of parents.
Education, which we predicted would reduce women’s desired fertility, is associated with a reduced
likelihood that women want more offspring than their husbands. In couples where women have more
education, couples are more likely to either agree on future fertility or have the husband desire more
future offspring than the wife. This suggests that women’s education – a critically important factor in
predicting reduced fertility outcomes (Castro Martin, 1995; Colleran & Snopkowski, 2018; Skirbekk,
2008; Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014) also influences desired fertility, particularly for women.
The resolution of fertility intentions finds few robust predictors. There is no evidence that greater
autonomy allows women to achieve their desired fertility, particularly when we examined women’s
autonomy in household decisions. The factors that were associated with fertility resolutions include
age at marriage and spousal age gap, where older women and greater age differences between spouses
were associated with women achieving their desired fertility. It is possible that women who marry at
older ages are more certain about their reproductive preferences (since they have had more time to
think about them) and are unlikely to revise them with time. This also provides evidence against
the argument that the fertility transition can be explained as an increase in women’s autonomy,
whereby women can achieve their lowered desired fertility through greater decision-making power
(see also Morgan, Stash, Smith, & Mason, 2002). Contextual factors may influence this finding;
Indonesia already had relatively low fertility at the time of the survey (total fertility rate in 1993
was 2.8) and women have long had relatively high levels of autonomy (Stoler, 1977), which may
obscure any relationship between autonomy and fertility outcomes.
There is no evidence that living near kin influences a person’s ability to achieve their desired fer-
tility. This is counter to some prior interpretations and may mean that this context is unique or that
women are generally not exploited into having children they do not want. Finally, we find that couples
are more likely to have fewer offspring when couples disagree on the number of children they want to
have – but that this result is only robust to following couples for seven years. The effect is eliminated
when we follow couples for at least 10 years, suggesting that seven years may not be sufficient time for
couples to complete their desired fertility.
As alluded to previously, these results need to be examined in light of the context of Indonesia.
Indonesia’s fertility was relatively low by 1993/1994 when the first wave of data was collected,
which could limit the level of conflict exhibited between couples. Women’s autonomy is generally
high in this country, allowing women opportunities that may not be available everywhere, which
may reduce or eliminate the exploitation of women. Further, polygyny is allowed in Indonesia and
may reduce conflict over reproductive decisions (Mulder & Rauch, 2009). This makes it unnecessary
for men or their families to try to exploit a woman if they can acquire an additional wife – which may
be the easiest route towards higher fertility for men, if it is desired. Contexts, like sub-Saharan Africa,
where greater differences in fertility preferences have been identified may be better locations to exam-
ine how these preferences are resolved.
There are a variety of limitations to this work. First, people may self-select their partners based on
reproductive preference (e.g. McAllister et al., 2012) or their desired future fertility may be the result of
prior negotiation and compromise. This means that our analyses cannot pick up prior negotiation and
may overemphasise agreement. It is also likely that people revise their preference for offspring over
time. These changes in desired fertility may lead to outcomes like ours, where few factors are asso-
ciated with who achieves their desired outcome. Individual personalities may be more influential in
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identifying who achieves their preference for offspring (Hutteman, Bleidorn, Penke, & Denissen,
2013). Stochastic processes may play an important role in understanding fertility outcomes
(Hruschka & Burger, 2016), which may reduce predictive power in these analyses. Additionally, people
may not accurately report their desired fertility, either because they do not contemplate these questions
or they try to report preferences that would be deemed socially acceptable, for instance by their com-
munity (Kazenin & Kozlov, 2020). While Indonesia is not known for having strong biases for sons or
daughters, some research has found that, at least in parts of Indonesia, there is a slight son preference
(Guilmoto, 2015). We did not examine how this may have influenced desired fertility or reproductive
outcomes, but it would be an important factor to include in countries with strong gender preferences.
Finally, we cannot comment on whether differences in fertility preferences are the result of adaptive
sexual conflict or the optimisation of factors other than fitness.
In conclusion, there is some evidence of conflict over fertility preferences, but no evidence that con-
flict is resolved in favour of men over women systematically in Indonesia. The factor that explains dif-
ferential fertility preferences best is kin availability, suggesting that women’s availability of alloparents
for support or exposure to pronatal messages influences their strategic preference for more offspring
under favourable social conditions.
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